Fundamentality	and	Modal	Freedom Jennifer	Wang 1.	Introduction The	notion	of	fundamentality	has	been	much	discussed	recently.	The	picture	is	that there	is	a	fundamental	level	of	the	world,	and	that	non-fundamental,	or	derivative,	features of	the	world	depend	upon	the	fundamental.	My	focus	in	this	paper	is	on	a	specific	question about	the	nature	of	fundamentality.	Many	agree	that	if	an	entity	is	fundamental,	then	it	is	in some	sense	ontologically	independent.1	This	is	accompanied	by	intuitions	that	it	is	'selfsufficient',	or	'need	not	look	outside	itself'.	It	is	commonly	believed	that	as	such, fundamental	entities	are	modally	free,	in	a	sense	to	be	clarified.2	Intuitively,	a	mark	of modal	freedom	is	some	form	of	free	recombination:	For	each	of	the	various	ways	modally free	entities	can	individually	be,	they	can	be	those	ways	with	each	other. The	claim	that	fundamentality	entails	modal	freedom	(FEMF)	may	seem	attractive. After	all,	if	an	entity	'need	not	look	outside	itself',	how	could	it	modally	depend	on	anything else?	Nonetheless,	the	road	from	fundamentality	to	modal	freedom	is	not	straightforward. Some	philosophers	endorse	views	that	are	incompatible	with	FEMF.	For	instance,	on	causal essentialism,	fundamental	properties	are	essentially	dispositions,	powers,	or	potentialities to	manifest	certain	states	of	affairs,	which	include	the	instantiation	of	other	fundamental properties.3	There	are	thus	modal	connections	between	fundamental	properties.	Other apparent	counterexamples	to	FEMF	stem	from	the	supposition	that	what's	fundamental	is determined	by	ideal	physics.	The	properties	and	relations	countenanced	by	our	best current	physical	theories	include	quantitative	properties	and	relations	such	as	mass, charge,	and	spatiotemporal	distance.	But	it	is	well-known	that	determinates	of	the	same determinable	are	incompatible	with	each	other	(e.g.	mass	50g	and	mass	60g),	and	that spatiotemporal	relations	obey	certain	metric	constraints,	and	thus	modal	constraints;	call this	view	incompatibilism.4	Finally,	the	phenomenon	of	non-separability	of	entangled	states in	quantum	mechanics	yields	a	view	on	which	there	may	be	necessary	connections between	fundamental	objects.5 My	aim	is	not	to	assess	these	competing	views,	about	which	much	has	been	written. Rather,	I	will	examine	the	positive	reasons	that	a	defender	of	FEMF	may	give	in	favor	of	her thesis.	I	begin	the	next	section	by	saying	more	about	the	notion	of	fundamentality	and	the relevant	types	of	fundamental	entities.	In	section	3,	I	give	a	more	careful	characterization	of modal	freedom.	I	then	examine	reasons	to	believe	FEMF	by	way	of	'direct'	and	'indirect' routes	in	sections	4	and	5.	Direct	routes	appeal	to	the	supposed	nature	of	fundamentality, whereas	indirect	routes	make	use	of	principles	that	appear	to	be	motivated	for 1	I	will	be	using	the	term	'entity'	liberally	to	apply	to	the	purported	members	of	different	ontological categories,	which	may	include	objects,	properties,	relations,	facts,	or	states	of	affairs. 2	This	notion	is	borrowed	and	adapted	from	Schaffer	(2010a). 3	For	just	a	few	examples,	see	Bird	(2007),	Shoemaker	(1980),	and	Vetter	(2015).	An	overview	of	recent defenders	is	presented	in	Vetter	(2011). 4	See	Jubien	(2009)	and	Wang	(2013). 5	Schaffer	(2010c)	takes	such	phenomena	to	show	that	such	states	aren't	fundamental,	but	his	argument appeals	to	FEMF.	Paul	(2012,	Forthcoming)	appeals	to	quantum	phenomena	to	argue	for	her	mereological bundle	theory,	which	is	plausibly	extended	into	a	view	on	which	there	are	necessary	connections	between fundamental	properties. 2 independent	reasons,	such	as	Hume's	dictum	that	there	are	no	necessary	connections between	distinct	existences.	I	argue	that	none	of	these	routes	provide	motivation	for	FEMF beyond	the	intuitions	that	fundamental	entities	are	'self-sufficient'	or	'need	not	look outside	themselves'.	In	fact,	as	I	will	suggest	in	section	6,	there	are	positive	reasons	to	hold that	the	fundamental	entities	are	not	modally	free. 2.	Fundamentality There	are	many	different	ways	to	understand	fundamentality.	Some	connect	the notion	of	fundamentality	to	other	notions,	such	as	grounding,	truthmaking,	naturalness, structure,	or	reality.	Others	take	the	notion	of	fundamentality	to	be	primitive,	conceptually basic,	or	otherwise	undefinable.	This	section	will	be	a	brief	overview	of	various	options.	My aim	is	not	to	endorse	any	particular	theory	of	fundamentality,	but	to	show	that fundamentality-like	notions	figure	in	a	range	of	current	metaphysical	debates.	The	reader who	is	already	convinced	of	this	may	move	on	to	section	3. First,	consider	the	notion	of	grounding,	which	is	a	notion	of	ontological dependence.6	This	notion	of	dependence	is	distinct	from	the	notions	of	causal, counterfactual	or	modal	dependence.	For	instance,	Sonia	Sotomayor	grounds	her	singleton set,	but	she	does	not	cause	it	to	exist.	Some	have	tried	to	explain	the	notion	of	grounding using	other	notions.7	Whether	or	not	this	project	eventually	succeeds,	many	agree	that grounding	has	certain	features:	It	is	irreflexive,	asymmetric,	and	transitive,	and	there	is	a distinction	between	full	and	partial	grounding.8	A	fundamental	entity,	on	this	view,	is	an ungrounded	entity:	one	that	does	not	ontologically	depend	on	anything	else.9 6	For	surveys	on	this	topic,	see	Clark	and	Liggins	(2012),	Correia	and	Schneider	(2012),	and	Trogdon	(2013a). I	will	assume	that	grounding	is	a	category-neutral	relation	that	holds	between	entities.	Some	restrict	it	to facts	so	that,	for	instance,	the	fact	that	Sonia	Sotomayor	exists	grounds	the	fact	that	her	singleton	exists;	see Audi	(2012a,	2012b)-though	he	denies	existence	facts-and	Rosen	(2010).	Facts	in	this	context	are	typically understood	to	be	more	like	states	of	affairs,	that	is,	objects	instantiating	properties	and	relations.	Others	say that	grounding	should	be	characterized	as	a	sentential	connective,	as	in:	'The	singleton	containing	Sonia Sotomayor	exists	because	Sonia	Sotomayor	exists';	see	Correia	(2010)	and	Fine	(2012).	The	connective	view is	neutral	on	whether	or	not	'because'	picks	out	a	relation.	Thus,	one	may	insist	that	some	truths	hold	in virtue	of	other	truths,	but	deny	that	these	may	be	traced	to	grounding	relations	between	entities.	In	fact,	some hold	that	ontological	dependence	and	grounding	come	apart;	see	Barnes	(Forthcoming).	Koslicki	(2013a, 2013b)	connects	the	notion	of	ontological	dependence	to	essence	and	substancehood. 7	See	discussions	in	Bennett	(2011a),	deRosset	(2013),	and	Sider	(2011). 8	There	is	disagreement	about	whether	grounding	has	these	features;	see	Barnes	(Forthcoming),	Donaldson (Forthcoming),	Jenkins	(2011),	Kleinschmidt	(2015),	Litland	(2013),	Raven	(2013),	Rodriguez-Pereyra (Forthcoming),	Schaffer	(2012),	and	Wilson	(2014b).	Strictly	speaking,	Barnes	distinguishes	ontological dependence	from	grounding,	and	she	takes	her	comments	to	apply	to	the	former	only.	However,	the	cases	she presents	could	be	modified	to	apply	to	grounding,	if	one	were	so	inclined.	Note	that	partial	grounding	may	be defined	in	terms	of	full	grounding	but	not	vice	versa;	see	Fine	(2012). 9	Bennett	(2011b,	Forthcoming)	appeals	to	what	she	considers	to	be	a	broader	notion,	that	of	building.	On	her view,	fundamentality	is	a	notion	of	ontological	independence	that	may	be	defined	in	terms	of	building,	so	that what	is	fundamental	is	unbuilt.	Building	relations	include	not	just	grounding,	but	also	composition, constitution,	set	formation,	realization,	microbased	determination,	and	causation.	Bennett	thus	rejects	that distinction	between	ontological	and	causal	independence.	Wilson	(2014b)	counts	many	of	the	same	relations among	what	she	calls	'small-g'	grounding	relations.	Both	deny	the	existence	of	a	univocal	dependence	relation that	is	more	fundamental	than	the	individual	relations. 3 Second,	fundamentality	may	be	understood	in	terms	of	truthmaking,	a	relation between	truths	and	the	entities	in	the	world	that	make	them	true.10	Truthmaking	is generally	agreed	to	be	irreflexive,	non-symmetric,	and	non-transitive.	Some	have	explained truthmaking	in	terms	of	other	notions,	such	as	entailment,	necessitation,	or	essence.11 What	matters	in	this	discussion	is	the	apparent	connection	between	truthmakers	and fundamentality.	Arguably,	the	fundamental	entities	are	those	that	jointly	comprise	the truthmakers	for	all	truths	that	have	truthmakers.12 Third,	consider	Lewis's	(1983)	notion	of	naturalness.	Lewis	holds	that	the	property structure	of	the	world	is	ordered	according	to	more	or	less	natural	properties.	At	bottom, there	are	the	perfectly	natural	properties,	those	that	'carve	reality	at	the	joints'.	These	are presumably	the	properties	countenanced	by	fundamental	physics.	Lewis	argues	that	we should	accept	the	distinction	between	natural	and	unnatural	properties	given	the theoretical	work	naturalness	can	do,	including: (i) characterizing	notions	such	as	duplication,	similarity,	intrinsicality,	and supervenience; (ii) determining	a	supervenience	basis	for	all	other	properties;	and (iii) formulating	theses	concerning	physicalism,	simplicity,	and	the	laws	of	nature.13 Sider	(2011)	extends	the	utility	of	the	notion	of	naturalness	by	positing	a	primitive	notion of	structure;	on	his	account,	not	only	may	predicates	be	structural,	other	logical	particles such	as	quantifiers	and	connectives	may	be	structural	as	well.	While	Sider	theorizes	in linguistic	terms,	structure	is	worldly.	One	may	say	thus	say	that	the	fundamental	entities just	are	the	perfectly	natural	or	structural	entities.14 Fourth,	one	might	take	the	position	that	the	notion	of	fundamentality	is	primitive, conceptually	basic,	or	undefinable.	Wilson	(2014b,	26)	suggests	that	there	is	something inappropriate	about	characterizing	the	notion	of	fundamentality	in	terms	of	any	other notion,	whether	positive	or	negative.	Fine	(2001,	25-6)	explicitly	takes	the	notion	of	reality to	be	primitive.	(Note	that	Fine	also	posits	a	primitive	notion	of	ground,	so	that	by	'real'	he does	not	simply	mean	'ungrounded'.)	And	Barnes	(2012)	takes	fundamental	to	be	primitive, as	well	as	distinct	from	ontologically	independent. My	aim	in	gesturing	at	these	various	notions	is	not	to	canvass	the	ways	in	which they	are	similar	and	dissimilar.	A	complete	catalogue	of	the	various	ways	philosophers have	talked	about	fundamentality	would	be	an	interesting	and	worthwhile	project,	but	is simply	not	feasible	here.	I	only	claim	to	have	provided	evidence	that	many	philosophers seem	to	have	latched	on	to	some	notion	of	fundamentality.	Furthermore,	they	seem	to	talk 10	Defenders	of	truthmaking	include	Armstrong	(2004),	Bigelow	(1988),	Cameron	(2008,	2010b),	Fox	(1987), Lowe	(2006,	2009),	Mulligan,	Rodriguez-Pereyra	(2006b),	and	Mulligan,	Simons	and	Smith	(1984).	See Rodriguez-Pereyra	(2006a)	for	a	survey	of	this	topic. 11	See	Armstrong	(1997),	Bigelow	(1988),	Fox	(1987),	and	Lowe	(2006,	2009). 12	See	Cameron	(2008,	2010b)	and	Schaffer	(2008). 13	The	claim	that	one	class	of	properties	may	play	all	of	these	different	theoretical	roles	is	challenged	in	Dorr and	Hawthorne	(2013). 14	Sider	himself	thinks	there	are	serious	limitations	to	talk	of	structural	entities	rather	structural	ideology;	see 6.3	of	his	book.	For	further	discussion	of	naturalness,	including	skepticism	that	one	such	notion	plays	all	of the	naturalness	roles,	see	Dorr	and	Hawthorne	(2013)	and	Eddon	(2013). 4 about	such	a	notion	univocally,	even	if	it	is	far	from	clear	that	the	same	fundamental entities	that	play,	e.g.,	the	truthmaker	role	also	play	the	naturalness	role.15	I	will	thus proceed	as	if	there	is	one	notion	of	fundamentality	in	question. There	are	various	categories	of	entities	that	may	be	fundamental;	the	two	I	will focus	on	are	object	and	property	or	relation.16	Much	of	the	discussion	below	applies	to	other candidates	for	fundamentality,	such	as	fact	or	state	of	affairs.	I	will	start	by	assuming	that fundamentality	is	category-relative,	so	that	an	entity	may	be	fundamental	in	its	own category	even	if	it	ultimately	depends	on	an	entity	in	a	different	category. 3.	Modal	freedom What	does	it	mean	for	a	fundamental	entity	to	be	modally	free?	For	those	who	work with	the	ideology	of	grounding,	there	is	a	relatively	uncontroversial	claim	in	the	vicinity	of FEMF,	called	'necessitarianism':	If	x	(fully)	grounds	y,	then	necessarily,	if	x	exists	then	y exists.17	Necessitarianism	on	its	own	does	not	entail	FEMF;	it	only	tells	us	that	grounded entities	are,	in	some	sense,	not	modally	free.	But	it	does	provide	a	suggestion	for	how	to characterize	modal	freedom.	Say	that	an	entity	x	is	absolutely	existentially	modally	free	iff	it is	not	the	case	that	there	is	some	distinct	entity	y	such	that	necessarily,	if	y	exists	then	x exists,	or	necessarily,	if	x	exists,	then	y	exists.	This	principle	tells	us	that	x	is	modally	free	in some	sense	just	in	case	its	existence	neither	is	necessitated	by	nor	necessitates	the existence	of	any	other	entity. Unfortunately,	absolute	existential	modal	freedom	is	not	the	most	useful	notion	to work	with.	Every	entity	is	such	that	necessarily,	it	exists	iff	its	singleton	set	exists,	even though	the	grounding	relation	holds	in	only	one	direction.18	From	this	mundane observation	it	follows	that	no	entity	is	absolutely	existentially	modally	free.	Furthermore, this	notion	of	freedom	tells	only	on	existential	freedom,	even	though	an	entity	that	must instantiate	a	certain	property	under	a	condition	involving	a	distinct	entity	also	lacks	modal freedom	in	some	sense. The	relevant	notion	of	modal	freedom	is	not	absolute,	but	relational.	Let's	turn	to Schaffer	(2010a)'s	characterization	of	(the	dyadic	case	of)	modal	freedom,	which	I	will	call 'Schaffer-freedom'.	Two	concrete	objects	are	Schaffer-free	if	any	way	that	one	can	be	and any	way	the	other	can	be	is	a	way	for	them	to	jointly	be,	(i)	barring	co-location,	and	(ii) leaving	the	rest	of	the	world	the	way	it	is.	On	what	'any	way	that	one	can	be'	means, Schaffer	writes	(2010a,	352):	'[C]onsider	all	of	the	intrinsic	natures	that	a	given	actual concrete	object	can	have,	together	with	all	of	the	spatiotemporal	locations	that	it	can occupy.	These	are	the	ways	that	this	can	be.	Also	add	in	the	one	way	that	it	can	fail	to	be. The	result	will	be	a	list	covering	the	how,	where,	and	whether	possibilities	for	this	thing.' Notice	the	restriction	to	intrinsic	properties	of	objects.	If	we	allowed	'ways'	to	range	over 15	Barnes	(2012)	and	Fine	(2001)	are	exceptions. 16	I	will	be	assuming	that	properties	and	relations	are	abundant,	even	if	we	may	further	classify	them	into 'sparse'	and	'abundant',	'fundamental'	and	'derivative',	'natural'	and	'nonnatural',	etc. 17	This	is	a	simplification	of	the	principle	that	typically	goes	under	this	name.	It	is	often	formulated	so	that	the grounds	may	be	a	set	or	plurality,	and	sometimes	it	is	time-indexed.	These	details	do	not	matter	for	this discussion.	Necessitarianism	is	widely	assumed,	but	see	deRosset	(2010)	and	Trogdon	(2013b)	for	explicit defenses.	For	arguments	against	necessitarianism,	see	Schaffer	(2010b),	Schnieder	(2006),	and	Skiles	(2015). 18	This	is	basically	Fine's	(1994)	counterexample	to	the	converse	of	necessitarianism. 5 extrinsic	properties	as	well,	then	given	that	one	way	for	an	object	to	be	is	such	that	some other	object	does	not	exist,	modal	freedom	would	be	too	difficult	to	obtain. The	first	qualification,	'barring	co-location',	is	by	Schaffer's	admission	already	a modal	constraint.	Assuming	that	two	concrete	objects	cannot	be	co-located,	it	would	be	a bad	result	if	two	entities	could	fail	to	be	modally	free	simply	because	being	located	at region	R	is	a	way	for	each	to	be	independently.	The	second	qualification	relativizes	modal freedom	to	the	rest	of	the	universe.	As	Schaffer	(2010a,	354)	puts	it:	'The	intuitive	idea	is that	if	two	actual	concrete	objects	really	are	[Schaffer-]free	of	each	other,	then	realizing their	combinations	should	not	require	alterations	to	anything	distinct.	By	'the	remainder	of the	world'	I	mean	the	concrete	universe	minus	the	sum	of	the	two	objects	in	question,	and by	'leaving	it	as	it	is'	I	mean	preserving	its	intrinsic	nature	and	spatiotemporal	location, while	not	adding	in	any	alien	properties	or	individuals.' Schaffer	is	only	concerned	with	concrete	objects-fundamental	or	not-in	the discussion	in	which	Schaffer-freedom	is	invoked.	In	contrast,	I'm	interested	in	a	notion	of modal	freedom	that	applies	to	other	candidates	for	fundamentality.	Furthermore,	this notion	of	modal	freedom	is	relative;	we	are	only	concerned	with	the	notion	of	a fundamental	entity's	being	modally	free	relative	to	some	class,	namely,	other	fundamental entities.	As	noted	above,	no	fundamental	entity	is	absolutely	existentially	modally	free,	but this	is	no	threat	to	modal	freedom.19	I	will	start	by	assuming	that	modal	freedom	is category-relative,	so	that	an	entity	may	be	modally	free	in	its	own	category	even	if	it	is modally	free	of	an	entity	of	a	different	category.	This	aligns	with	the	starting	assumption	of fundamentality	as	category-relative.	Cross-category	modal	freedom	must	be	addressed eventually,	but	category-relative	fundamentality	is	still	useful	as	a	starting	point.	I	will	later take	consider	cross-category	modal	freedom. First,	let	Γ	be	the	set	of	fundamental	objects,	and	let	'ways	an	object	can	be'	range over	the	intrinsic	properties	that	an	object	may	have,	in	addition	to	existence	or	nonexistence.	Following	Schaffer's	lead:	Γ	is	modally	free	iff	for	any	ways	that	any	objects	in	Γ can	be,	they	may	respectively	be	those	ways.	A	merely	dyadic	notion	of	freedom	cannot account	for	cases	where	two	fundamental	properties	x	and	y	require	that	a	third	have	some property	in	order	for	x	and	y	to	jointly	be	some	way.	(Schaffer	himself	extends	his characterization	to	variably	polyadic	cases	of	modal	freedom.)	The	present characterization	relativizes	freedom	to	the	set	of	all	fundamental	objects.	As	such,	the qualification	'leaving	the	remainder	of	the	world	as	it	is'	must	be	dropped.	This	is	because changes	in	the	properties	of	fundamental	objects	may	lead	to	changes	in	derivative	objects, but	this	does	not	seem	to	be	a	problem	for	the	modal	freedom	of	fundamental	objects.	I	am also	ignoring	the	issue	of	co-location.	I	agree	with	Schaffer	that	banning	co-location	is already	a	modal	constraint,	and	should	thus	not	be	built	into	the	characterization	of	modal freedom. Second,	let	Γ	be	the	set	of	fundamental	properties	and	relations.	If	we	mimic	the case	of	objects,	we	get	this:	Γ	is	modally	free	iff	for	any	ways	that	any	properties	or relations	in	Γ	may	be,	they	may	respectively	be	those	ways.	On	this	formulation,	what matters	are	intrinsic	properties	of	properties	or	relations,	or	their	existence	or nonexistence.	But	it	is	not	clear	that	there	are	interesting	contingent	intrinsic	properties	of 19	It	worth	noting	that	Zimmerman	(Forthcoming)	takes	issue	with	Schaffer's	characterization	of	modal freedom.	Restricting	our	attention	to	fundamental	entities	avoids	many	of	these	issues. 6 properties	or	relations;	necessary	intrinsic	properties,	such	as	being	a	property	or	being	a relation,	must	be	instantiated.	It	may	be	that	some	properties	only	exist	contingently,	but this	is	a	substantive	and	controversial	philosophical	thesis.	In	any	case,	the	resulting	notion of	modal	freedom,	even	if	satisfied	by	the	fundamental	properties	and	relations,	is	still somewhat	boring.	(Similar	difficulties	apply	to	the	principle	for	objects	if	one	believes	in fundamental	abstract	objects.)	When	it	comes	to	properties	or	relations,	their	more interesting	features	are	extrinsic,	i.e.	how	they're	intantiated.	So	a	better	principle	for properties	and	relations	is	this:	Γ	is	modally	free	iff	any	pattern	of	instantiation	of	the properties	or	relations	in	Γ	is	possible.	This	avoids	the	issue	with	co-location	since properties	may	co-exist	in	the	same	object.	And	for	similar	reasons	as	in	the	objects	case,	it avoids	the	issue	of	the	'remainder	of	the	world'.20 Many	fundamentality	theorists	seem	to	have	intuitions	that	support	FEMF.	Some endorsements	are	explicit.	For	instance,	Schaffer	(2010c,	40)	writes,	'[A]	plurality	of entities	is	freely	recombinable	if	and	only	if	any	combination	of	ways	that	each	entity	can be	individually	is	a	way	that	the	plurality	can	be	collectively.	If	entities	are	metaphysically independent,	then	they	should	be	modally	unconstrained	in	combination.'21	Other endorsements	are	less	explicit.	Many	accept	a	principle	of	free	recombination	that	takes their	fundamental	entities	as	elements	of	recombination.	For	instance,	Lewis's	(1986) perfectly	natural	properties	obey	a	principle	of	recombination	over	points	of	spacetime. And	Armstrong	(1989)	is	sympathetic	to	a	notion	of	independence	for	his	sparse universals,	even	if	he	doesn't	entirely	commit	to	FEMF.	In	any	case,	he	writes	approvingly of	Wittgenstein's	(1921/1961)	freely	recombinable	atomic	states	of	affairs.	There	are	also fundamentality	theorists	who	do	not	discuss	the	question,	or	are	outright	committed	to rejecting	FEMF.	(See	section	6.)	But	it	is	clear	that	FEMF	is	widely	endorsed,	if	not universally	accepted,	and	is	worthy	of	careful	examination. 4.	Direct	routes	to	FEMF In	this	section,	I	consider	direct	routes	to	FEMF.	The	goal	will	be	to	examine	reasons in	favor	of	FEMF	that	stem	from	the	supposed	nature	of	fundamental	entities. 4.1	The	intuitions As	noted,	many	theorists	seem	to	endorse	FEMF	on	the	basis	of	the	intuition	that whatever	is	fundamental	is	'self-sufficient',	or	'need	not	look	outside	itself'.	The	appeal	to intuitions	can	be	a	useful	first	step	in	theorizing	about	a	metaphysical	notion,	for	intuitions may	clarify	what	work	a	notion	is	intended	to	do.	However,	these	intuitions	do	not decisively	yield	FEMF.	If	fundamentality	is	a	notion	of	ontological	independence,	then	the intuition	that	fundamental	entities	are	in	some	sense	self-sufficient	is	unsurprising.	But	it	is not	clear	what	else	follows	from	this	claim.	A	self-sufficient	person	can	take	care	of	her	own basic	needs	without	the	interference	of	others.	A	self-sufficient	homestead	contains	its	own 20	These	formulations	of	modal	freedom-for	objects	and	for	properties	and	relations-are	independent	of each	other.	I	am	inclined	to	think	that	the	characterization	of	modal	freedom	for	properties	and	relations	is the	one	that	generalizes	to	other	candidates	for	fundamental	categories	of	entities,	e.g.	facts	or	states	of affairs.	This	is	because	the	intrinsic	properties	of	these	entities	don't	appear	to	be	modally	malleable.	In contrast,	the	intrinsic	properties	of	objects	are,	unless	one	accepts	something	like	mereologically	essentialism in	the	case	of	concrete	objects. 21	See	also	Bennett	(2011a,	Forthcoming)	and	Schaffer	(2003,	2010a). 7 source	of	production	for	its	main	needs,	such	as	food,	energy,	and	household	materials.	A self-sufficient	economy	does	not	require	external	trade.	There	is	a	common	theme	of freedom	from	external	influences	in	these	examples.	But	this	kind	of	freedom	is	already contained	in	the	notion	of	ontological	independence	in	the	case	of	fundamental	entities. And	crucially,	ontological	independence	is	not	modal	independence.	After	all,	the	theories of	fundamentality	discussed	in	section	2	are	stated	without	the	assumption	of	FEMF. If	the	intuition	that	what's	fundamental	is	'self-sufficient'	supports	FEMF,	then	it should	at	least	be	acknowledged	that	this	is	mere	intuition.	But	there	remains	a	problem. The	intuitions	that	underlie	FEMF	are	undermined	given	the	possibility	of	fundamental entities	of	different	categories.	The	restriction	in	the	characterization	of	modal	freedom	to different	categories	of	entity	is	already	a	constraint.	If	fundamental	properties	and relations	'need	not	look	outside	themselves',	and	fundamental	objects	'need	not	look outside	themselves',	then	they	should	be	free	to	coexist	with	each	other	in	any	combination. But	this	is	not	the	case.	Objects	can	only	instantiate	properties	and	relations,	and	indeed cannot	exist	without	instantiating	properties	or	relations.	Likewise,	properties	and relations	can	only	be	instantiated	by	objects. Of	course,	I	have	not	yet	articulated	a	category-neutral	principle	for	FEMF	that	such cases	violate.	This	task	is	not	straightforward.	I	arrived	at	the	principles	for	objects	and	for properties	and	relations	in	part	by	considering	how	they	are	thought	to	interact	with	each other.	Objects	have	properties	and	stand	in	relations,	and	these	in	turn	are	instantiated	by objects.	Other	candidates	for	categories	of	fundamental	entities	may	require	their	own principles	depending	on	the	ways	that	they	may	be.	Suppose,	for	instance,	that	there	are fundamental	states	of	affairs.	States	of	affairs	may	be	said	to	have	objects,	properties,	or relations	as	constituents.	So	perhaps	a	way	for	a	state	of	affairs	to	be	is	for	it	to	have	suchand-such	objects,	properties,	or	relations	as	constituents,	and	perhaps	it	is	contingent whether	it	exists.	However,	it	does	not	seem	like	the	resulting	principle	is	plausible:	where Γ	is	the	class	of	fundamental	states	of	affairs,	Γ	is	modally	free	iff	for	any	ways	that	any states	of	affairs	in	Γ	can	be,	they	can	respectively	be	those	ways.	This	is	not	plausible because	fundamental	states	of	affairs	that	share	constituents	arguably	are	not	modally	free of	each	other.	The	prospects	seem	dim	for	a	category-neutral	principle	for	defenders	of FEMF. But	this	does	not	mean	that	the	problem	of	cross-category	modal	freedom disappears.	In	fact,	that	the	principles	are	hard	to	formulate	is	evidence	that	we	have deeply	entrenched	views	about	how	entities	from	different	ontological	categories	must relate	to	each	other.	Although	it	is	conceivable,	in	the	abstract,	that	there	are	distinct fundamental	ontological	categories	such	that	the	entities	in	each	stand	in	only	trivial relations	to	each	other	(e.g.	co-existence),	the	categories	actually	invoked	are	not	like	this.	I thus	reiterate:	if	'self-sufficiency'	truly	is	the	motivation	for	FEMF,	then	the	FEMF	theorist should	say	that	there	is	at	most	one	category	of	fundamental	entities. One	may	deny	that	there	are	fundamental	entities	of	different	categories	by endorsing	a	one-category	ontology.	For	instance,	one	may	endorse	a	'properties-first'	view, on	which	facts	about	objects	are	reducible	to	facts	about	distributions	of	properties	and relations.22	Alternatively,	one	may	endorse	an	'objects-first'	ontology,	perhaps	accepting	a version	of	nominalism	about	properties	and	relations.	I	do	not	object	to	such	views	per	se. 22	For	discussion	in	the	fundamentality	literature,	see	Dasgupta	(2009)	and	Paul	(2012,	Forthcoming). 8 However,	such	views	involve	commitments	not	yet	undertaken	by	many	fundamentality theorists. 4.2	The	explanatory	independence	of	the	fundamental In	any	case,	the	first	route	to	FEMF	is	no	more	than	mere	intuition.	Can	the	defender of	FEMF	provide	reasons	based	on	more	substantive	considerations	about	the	nature	of fundamentality?	Here's	a	second	route	to	FEMF	that	appeals	to	the	connection	between ontological	independence	and	a	distinctively	metaphysical	form	of	explanation.	The reasoning	goes	something	like	this:	Fundamentality	is	a	sort	of	explanatory	independence. So	if	x	is	fundamental,	then	the	explanation	for	its	existence	must	not	require	anything extrinsic	to	x. But	this	alone	doesn't	show	that	FEMF	is	true.	After	all,	we've	merely	put	the	claim that	x	is	fundamental	another	way.	When	we	say	that	the	explanation	of	x's	existence	does not	require	anything	extrinsic	to	x,	we	are	merely	saying	that	nothing	outside	of	x contributes	to	the	metaphysical	explanation	of	its	existence.	This	does	not	entail	that	x's existence	does	not	necessitate	the	existence	of	anything	else,	nor	that	nothing	else necessitates	x's	existence.	The	above	considerations	about	fundamental	entities	of	different types	may	provide	an	example	of	how	there	could	be	necessary	connections	between fundamental	entities	that	are	nonetheless	explanatorily	independent,	as	one	may	insist	that the	existence	of	fundamental	objects	is	not	explained	by	the	existence	of	fundamental properties,	nor	vice	versa.23 5.	Indirect	routes In	this	section,	I	examine	indirect	routes	to	FEMF,	those	on	which	FEMF	follows from	the	application	of	a	principle	that	appears	to	be	independently	motivated. 5.1	Hume's	dictum The	main	'indirect'	route	proceeds	via	Hume's	dictum,	a	principle	endorsed	by	many independently	of	discussion	of	FEMF.	Hume's	dictum	is	typically	formulated	like	so:	There are	no	necessary	connections	between	distinct	existents.24	Though	it	is	inspired	by	Hume,	the various	contemporary	formulations	do	not	aim	to	be	faithful	to	Hume	himself.	For	instance, even	though	Hume	was	discussing	necessary	connections	in	the	context	of	causation, contemporary	formulations	typically	do	not	limit	themselves	in	this	way.	The	variety	of necessity	in	question	is	metaphysical,	rather	than	causal,	physical,	deontic,	conceptual,	or some	other	variety. If	there	are	no	necessary	connections	between	distinct	existents,	then	any	way	an existent	can	be	is	(with	minor	qualifications)	compossible	with	any	way	a	distinct	existent can	be.	And	if	fundamental	entities	are	distinct	existents,	then	it	seems	like	there's	a	fairly straightforward	route	from	Hume's	dictum	to	FEMF.	However,	Hume's	dictum	is	unclear	as formulated.	For	one	thing,	what	is	an	existent?	I	will	alongside	others	simply	interpret 'existent'	as	'entity'.	But	one	may	think	Hume's	dictum	applies	to	only	some	subclass	of entities	one	believes	in,	such	as	concrete	objects. 23	In	any	case,	I	suspect	that	the	connection	between	modality	and	explanation	requires	much	closer examination	in	order	for	this	route	to	FEMF	to	get	off	the	ground.	A	good	starting	place	is	Kment	(2014). 24	For	thorough	examination	of	Hume's	dictum	in	recent	literature,	see	Wilson	(2010,	2014a,	2015). 9 A	second	issue	is	that	it	is	not	clear	what	is	meant	by	'necessary	connections'.	There appear	to	be	trivial	necessary	connections	between	distinct	objects.	For	instance,	many accept	the	necessity	of	identity	and	distinctness,	which	state,	respectively,	that	any	object	is necessarily	identical	to	itself	(so	any	two	objects	are	necessarily	such	that	each	is	selfidentical),	and	any	two	distinct	objects	are	necessarily	non-identical.	DeRosset	(2009) suggests	that	we	distinguish	between	necessary	relations	like	these,	and	necessary connections,	though	he	does	not	offer	a	criterion	whereby	to	distinguish	them.	He	(158) writes,	'Difficult	as	this	distinction	is	to	explain	clearly,	it	is	as	indispensable	as	it	is intuitively	compelling.'	I	don't	know	if	this	is	right.	But	it	seems	sensible	to	stipulate	that objects	x	and	y	are	necessarily	connected	if	some	intrinsic	property	that	one	instantiates has	modal	implications	for	the	intrinsic	properties	that	the	other	instantiates.	This	aligns the	modal	independence	invoked	in	Hume's	dictum	with	our	notion	of	modal	freedom	for objects.	Adjustments	may	be	made	for	the	case	of	properties	and	relations. A	third	issue	is	that	it	is	not	clear	what	is	meant	by	'distinct'.	A	straightforward interpretation	is	that	the	sense	of	distinctness	in	question	is	numerical	distinctness,	e.g. there	are	no	necessary	connections	between	numerically	distinct	entities.	Unfortunately, this	leaves	us	with	an	implausible	principle.	Take	a	bicycle	and	one	of	its	parts,	like	its chain.	The	bicycle	is	numerically	distinct	from	its	chain,	but	the	bicycle	(construed	as	a mereological	sum,	at	least)	cannot	exist	without	the	chain.	So	this	interpretation	of	Hume's dictum	is	false.	Many	say	instead	that	Hume's	dictum	does	not	apply	to	two	entities	unless they	are	'wholly	distinct'.	Let's	consider	some	candidate	interpretations	of	'wholly	distinct'. Here's	one	option	available	to	those	who	work	with	the	ideology	of	grounding.	Let 'wholly	distinct'	mean	'grounding	distinct',	where	two	entities	x	and	y	are	grounding distinct	iff	it	is	not	the	case	that	(i)	x	(partially)	grounds	y,	(ii)	y	(partially)	grounds	x,	or (iii)	x	and	y	share	a	common	(partial)	ground.25	Thus: Grounding	distinctness:	Entities	are	wholly	distinct	just	in	case	they	are grounding	distinct. One	may	believe	that	the	Eiffel	Tower	and	the	Washington	Monument	are	each	nonfundamental	entities,	but	are	grounding	distinct.	In	this	case,	Hume's	dictum	would	say	that there	are	no	necessary	connections	between	the	Eiffel	Tower	and	the	Washington Monument.	This	interpretation	straightforwardly	entails	FEMF. Next,	Wilson	(2010)	suggests	these	two	interpretations: Spatiotemporal	distinctness:	Entities	are	wholly	distinct	just	in	case	they	do	not spatiotemporally	overlap. Mereological	distinctness:	Entities	are	wholly	distinct	just	in	case	they	do	not	share a	mereological	part. These	are	each	plausible	candidates	for	'wholly	distinct'.26 25	This	is	the	notion	of	distinctness	invoked	in	Ismael	and	Schaffer	(Forthcoming). 26	Note	that	Wilson	herself	does	not	argue	that	Hume's	dictum	leads	to	FEMF.	See	Wilson	(2012). 10 Finally,	consider	deRosset	(2009,	158)	on	the	question:	'I	will	say	that	two	things are	wholly	distinct	if	they	are	not	merely	numerically	distinct,	but	also	"distinct	existents" in	the	intended	sense.	For	instance,	sets	and	their	members,	sums	and	their	parts,	and ordinary	physical	things	and	their	physical	parts	provide	examples	of	numerically	but	not wholly	distinct	individuals.'	To	this	list,	Wilson	(2010)	adds	members	of	natural	kinds	and their	essential	intrinsic	properties,	and	mental	states	and	the	physical	states	that	realize them.	These	examples	all	invoke	varieties	of	what	may	be	called	'constitutional'	relations (which	include	mereological	relations	as	well).	So	let's	also	add: Constitutional	distinctness:	Entities	are	wholly	distinct	just	in	case	they	do	not	stand in	constitutional	relations	to	each	other. With	these	interpretations	in	mind,	does	Hume's	dictum	provide	reason	to	believe FEMF?	As	mentioned	above,	given	certain	assumptions,	the	first	on	its	various interpretations	entails	the	second-so	in	this	sense,	yes.	But	my	question	is	more	specific. Can	one	who	is	antecedently	neutral	on	FEMF	use	Hume's	dictum	to	justify	it?	If	the	truth	of an	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum	relies	on	the	same	intuitions	that	underlie	belief	in FEMF-e.g.	the	intuitions	of	'self-sufficiency',	or	that	the	entities	in	question	'need	not	look outside	themselves'-then	this	version	of	Hume's	dictum	is	not	an	independent	source	of belief	in	FEMF.	For	each	candidate	interpretation	of	distinctness,	there	are	two	questions	to consider:	(1)	are	the	fundamental	objects	and	properties/relations	distinct	in	this	sense?; and	(2)	is	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum	independently	motivated? First,	consider	grounding	distinctness.	It	is	trivial	that	any	two	fundamental	entities are	grounding	distinct,	since	fundamental	entities	are	ungrounded.	Hence	the	first	question is	easily	answered.	But	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum	does	not	seem independently	motivated.	The	intuition	behind	the	belief	that	there	are	no	necessary connections	between	grounding	distinct	entities	might	be	this:	If	two	entities	are grounding-distinct,	then	they	neither	ground	each	other	nor	share	a	common	ground,	so they	'have	nothing	to	do	with	each	other'.	In	that	sense,	while	they	may	not	be	'selfsufficient'	simpliciter,	neither	requires	the	other. Second,	consider	mereological	distinctness,	and	specifically	the	case	of	fundamental objects.	Are	these	mereologically	distinct,	and	is	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's dictum	independently	motivated?	One	may	reason	as	so:	If	two	objects	overlap,	then	they share	a	part,	and	it	is	reasonable	to	believe	that	whatever	fundamentality	structure	of	the world,	things	with	parts	are	not	fundamental.	Schaffer	himself	rejects	this	view-on	his 'priority	monism',	the	most	fundamental	concrete	object	is	the	entire	universe,	the	cosmos as	a	whole.	But	even	on	priority	monism,	the	one	fundamental	object	does	not mereologically	overlap	with	any	other	fundamental	object. I	conjecture	that	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum	still	comes	down	to mere	intuition.	Why	believe	that	there	are	no	necessary	connections	between mereologically	distinct	objects?	Perhaps	one	has	the	intuition	that	mereologically	distinct objects	'have	nothing	to	do	with	each	other'.	This	appeals	to	the	same	intuitions	invoked	in 11 grounding	distinctness,	and	as	suggested	above,	in	FEMF.	So	this	interpretation	of	Hume's dictum	is	not	independently	motivated	either.27 Now	consider	the	case	of	fundamental	properties	and	relations.	Are	these mereologically	distinct,	and	is	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum	independently motivated?	There	is	an	extra	complication	in	this	case,	which	is	that	it	seems	to	assume	that there	are	mereological	relations	between	properties.	Perhaps	one	does	endorse	this	view, believing	for	instance	that	the	property	of	being	red	has	the	property	of	being	maroon	as	a part.	One	may	then	think	that	the	fundamental	properties	and	relations	must	be mereologically	distinct.	But	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum	relies	on	the same	intuitions	as	FEMF,	as	discussed	above.	On	the	other	hand,	if	one	believes	that	all properties	and	relations	are	mereologically	distinct-perhaps	because	they	are	not mereologically	related,	period-then	on	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum,	all properties	are	modally	free	of	each	other,	including	the	property	of	being	red	and	the property	of	being	maroon.	This	seems	to	be	the	wrong	result. Third,	consider	spatiotemporal	distinctness,	and	the	case	of	objects.	It	is	not	clear that	fundamental	objects	must	be	spatiotemporally	distinct-for	if	there	are	such	things	as extended	simples,	it	may	well	be	that	they	are	fundamental,	yet	spatiotemporally	coincide. One	may	reject	this	possibility;	but	even	so,	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum relies	on	the	same	intuitions	as	FEMF.	For	why	believe	it,	unless	one	has	the	intuition	that spatiotemporally	distinct	objects	'have	nothing	to	do	with	each	other'? Consider	next	the	case	of	properties	and	relations.	Are	they	spatiotemporally distinct,	and	is	the	resulting	interpretation	of	Hume's	dictum	independently	motivated? Suppose	one	believes	that	properties	and	relations	may	have	spatiotemporal	location, perhaps	because	they	are	immanent	universals	or	tropes.	In	this	case,	it	is	implausible	that the	fundamental	properties	and	relations	must	be	distinct-after	all,	an	object	can instantiate	more	than	one	property,	and	stand	in	multiple	relations	to	other	objects.	There is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	there	is	a	special	restriction	when	it	comes	to	the	fundamental. On	the	other	hand,	suppose	one	denies	that	properties	and	relations	may	have spatiotemporal	location.	But	then	a	similar	problem	arises	as	in	the	case	of	mereological distinctness.	All	properties	and	relations	turn	out	to	be	spatiotemporally	distinct,	including the	property	of	red	and	the	property	of	maroon,	which	makes	the	resulting	interpretation of	Hume's	dictum	false. Finally,	consider	constitutional	distinctness.	As	this	version	of	Hume's	dictum	is more	general	than	the	previous	two,	it	inherits	their	problems.	Worse,	it	is	not	clear	that so-called	'constitutional'	relations	form	a	similarity	class	at	all.	Wilson's	(2010)	view	of what	counts	as	a	constitution	relation	invokes	the	notion	of	ontological	dependence.	For her,	constitutional	relations	are	simply	those	relations	that	hold	between	entities	that	are not	wholly	distinct.	This	notion	of	distinctness	does	not	shed	light	on	what	it	means	for	two entities	to	be	wholly	distinct. 5.2	Humean	supervenience 27	Part	of	Lewis's	view	is	that	when	it	comes	to	concreta,	mereologically	distinct	objects	may	be	freely recombined.	This	is	one	of	the	basic	tenets	of	his	metaphysical	views.	One	of	Lewis's	own	complaints	about necessary	connections	between	distinct	existences	is	that	he	finds	them	'unintelligible';	see	Lewis	(1983,	366; 1986a,	181). 12 Here	is	another	route	to	FEMF.	One	might	be	motivated	by	a	desire	to	reduce	the world	to	its	intrinsic	properties.	Such	a	person	might	have	Lewisian	intuitions	that	all global	matters	of	fact	may	be	explained	by	local	matters	of	fact.	Lewis	(1986b,	ix-x)	himself writes: Humean	supervenience	is	named	in	honor	of	the	greater	denier	of	necessary connections.	It	is	the	doctrine	that	all	there	is	to	the	world	is	a	vast	mosaic	of	local matters	of	particular	fact,	just	one	little	thing	and	then	another	...	We	have geometry:	a	system	of	external	relations	of	spatiotemporal	distance	between	points. Maybe	points	of	spacetime	itself,	maybe	point-sized	bits	of	matter	or	aether	or fields,	maybe	both.	And	at	those	points	we	have	local	qualities:	perfectly	natural intrinsic	properties	which	need	nothing	bigger	than	a	point	at	which	to	be instantiated.	For	short:	we	have	an	arrangement	of	qualities.	And	that	is	all.	There	is no	difference	without	difference	in	the	arrangement	of	qualities.	All	else	supervenes on	that. As	this	characterization	concerns	only	properties	and	relations,	let's	set	aside	the case	of	fundamental	objects.	Let's	also	grant	the	viability	of	Humean	supervenience.	Part	of the	doctrine	of	Humean	supervenience	is	that	all	contingent	facts	about	a	world	supervene on	the	pattern	of	instantiation	of	the	perfectly	natural	properties	over	point-sized	objects, along	with	their	spatiotemporal	relations.	Another	part	is	that	all	(actual)	perfectly	natural properties	are	intrinsic.28	The	important	part,	for	our	discussion,	is	a	modal	claim:	Any pattern	of	instantiation	of	the	perfectly	natural	properties	over	point-sized	objects,	along with	their	spatiotemporal	relations,	is	possible. It	is	not	clear	that	the	notions	of	fundamentality	and	perfect	naturalness	coincide. While	Lewis	sometimes	uses	the	term	'fundamental',	he	does	not	seem	to	mean 'ontologically	independent';	rather,	it	seems	to	be	just	another	way	to	say	'perfectly natural'.	Perfectly	natural	properties	play	different	theoretical	roles	when	it	comes	to topics	in	metaphysics	such	as	similarity,	duplication,	intrinsicality,	physicalism,	and	the laws	of	nature.	A	case	can	be	made	that	one	of	these	roles	is	to	be	ontologically independent.	But	it	is	controversial	whether	these	roles	are	jointly	satisfiable.29 The	defender	of	FEMF	may	avoid	these	difficulties	by	modifying	Lewis's characterization	of	Humean	supervenience	so	that	it	invokes	fundamental	properties rather	than	perfectly	natural	properties	(even	if	they	ultimately	coincide).	She	may	say	that all	fundamental	properties	are	intrinsic,	perhaps	by	saying	that	this	is	just	part	of	the nature	of	fundamentality.	The	idea	is	then	that	any	pattern	of	instantiation	of	fundamental properties	over	point-sized	objects,	along	with	their	spatiotemporal	relations,	is	possible. We	still	need	to	get	from	here	to	FEMF:	Any	pattern	of	instantiation	of	the fundamental	properties	and	relations	is	possible.	Plausibly,	fundamental	properties	are only	instantiated	by	point-sized	objects.	Let's	grant	that	this	is	not	a	problem.	But	the defender	of	FEMF	must	say	something	about	fundamental	relations.	Relations	are	typically 28	See	Lewis	(1983,	357);	Robinson	(1993)	holds	that	fundamental	physical	properties	are	paradigmatically intrinsic. 29	See	Dorr	and	Hawthorne	(2013)	and	Weatherson	(2013).	Weatherson	(2006)	argues	that	there	must	be non-fundamental	perfectly	natural	properties. 13 classified	as	internal	or	external,	where	a	relation	is	internal	just	in	case	it	supervenes	on the	intrinsic	properties	of	its	relata,	and	otherwise	external.	The	defender	of	FEMF	ought	to deny	the	possibility	of	fundamental	internal	relations.	After	all,	an	internal	relation depends	on	its	relata.	If	she	is	to	admit	fundamental	relations	at	all,	they	must	be	external. Lewis	himself	admits	spatiotemporal	relations,	which	are	paradigmatically	external relations,	and	builds	them	into	his	characterization	of	Humean	supervenience.	He	is	free	to say	that	spatiotemporal	relations	are	perfectly	natural	without	requiring	them	to	be modally	free	of	the	perfectly	natural	properties.	But	spatiotemporal	relations-and	other cases	of	external	fundamental	relations,	if	there	are	any-are	problematic	for	the	defender of	FEMF.	For	if	spatiotemporal	relations	are	treated	separately	in	the	characterization	of Humean	supervenience,	then	we	cannot	get	from	Humean	supervenience	to	FEMF.30 Here	is	one	final	point.	On	the	assumption	that	Humean	supervenience	is	true,	it entails	FEMF	only	if	there	are	no	fundamental	relations.	But	even	if	there	are	no fundamental	relations,	the	defender	of	FEMF	has	not	identified	an	independently	motivated indirect	route	to	FEMF.	Wilson	(2015,	141)	points	out	Humean	supervenience	is	not	too	far from	Hume's	dictum: The question becomes more pressing upon recognizing that Lewis's specification of the fundamental properties as "intrinsic" doesn't suffice to rule out [necessary connections between wholly distinct entities], though he often speaks as though it does. For a property may be intrinsic, in that its instantiation does not require the existence or instantiation of any other objects or properties ... and yet still be "modally loaded," in that, for example, the property is necessarily such that when instanced in certain circumstances, it (its instance) brings about certain effects. What then prevents the "intrinsic" fundamental physical properties in Lewis's supervenience base from standing in various necessary connections to other (actually or possibly instanced) properties? This	observation	shows	that	the	motivation	for	FEMF	based	on	a	fondness	for Humean	supervenience	should	really	be	assimilated	into	the	discussion	of	Hume's	dictum as	a	motivation	for	FEMF.	And	if	the	arguments	of	the	last	section	are	correct,	this	means that	Humean	supervenience	does	not	provide	an	independent	motivation	for	FEMF. 5.3	The	inductive	argument A	third	route	to	FEMF	appeals	to	a	certain	explanatory	asymmetry	between fundamental	and	derivative	entities,	and	may	be	framed	as	an	inductive	argument. Consider	cases	where	it's	clear	that	two	things	are	necessarily	connected.	A	region	of spacetime	is	necessarily	connected	to	any	region	contained	in	it.	Necessarily,	Sonia Sotomayor	exists	iff	her	singleton	exists.	We	may	look	to	examples	of	the	types	of	entities that	are	constitutionally	related	for	further	examples	of	necessarily	connected	entities: sums	and	their	parts,	members	of	natural	kinds	and	their	essential	intrinsic	properties, 30	Michael	Della	Rocca	has	pointed	out	to	me	that	the	defender	of	FEMF	might	simply	accept	external	relations among	her	fundamental	entities.	I	agree	that	this	is	an	available	move.	But	I	deny	that	the	most	plausible candidates	for	fundamental	relations	recombine	nicely	with	the	most	plausible	candidates	for	fundamental properties. 14 mental	states	and	their	physical	realizers.	These	are	cases	where	one	entity	is	ontologically dependent	on	another.	This	suggests	an	inductive	generalization	to	the	conclusion	that	all cases	of	necessary	connections	between	distinct	entities	involve	cases	where	one	is ontologically	dependent	upon	another.31 The	pull	of	these	cases	is	strong-if	these	are	the	only	sorts	of	cases	we	look	at.	But consider	the	views	that	reject	FEMF	mentioned	in	section	1.	The	causal	essentialist	thinks there	are	fundamental	properties	that	stand	in	necessary	causal	connections	to	each	other, and	the	incompatibilist	thinks	there	are	fundamental	properties	that	are	necessarily incompatible	with	each	other.	Another	view	mentioned	holds	that	there	are	necessary connections	between	fundamental	particles	in	an	entangled	state.	We	ought	not	to	exclude this	evidence	outright	in	order	to	make	the	inductive	argument	work.32 5.4	All-things-considered	theoretical	virtue It	may	be	that	neither	Hume's	dictum	nor	Humean	supervenience	provide	an independent	reason	to	believe	FEMF.	But	we	should	not	give	up	on	them;	they	may	figure in	a	different	indirect	route	to	FEMF.	This	route	is	suggested	by	Wilson	(2015,	155): [A]t the end of the day there is one other consideration that might lead us to endorse HD, as presupposed by Lewis's account of combinatorialism. While, as I've here tried to show, Lewis's account of combinatorialism has its problems, other accounts also have their problems. And even if on this specific issue Lewis's account, and associated appeal to HD, does not come out ahead, it might be that all things considered Lewis's overall framework motivates HD, as presupposed not just in his account of the space of metaphysical modality but moreover, as we have seen, as presupposed in nearly every important aspect of his systematic philosophy. And so far as the end game of deciding which systematic philosophy is the best, Lewis's views are very much still in the running. Wilson	is	talking	about	Hume's	dictum	specifically,	but	her	strategy	may	be extended	to	FEMF.	This	is	a	broad	methodological	maxim	that	many	philosophers	follow: The	best	theory	is	that	which	fares	best	overall	with	respect	to	the	theoretical	virtues. These	may	include	conservatism,	modesty,	simplicity,	generality,	and	refutability,	as articulated	in	Quine	(1970). This	strategy	is	arguably	the	most	promising	for	the	defender	of	FEMF.	If	FEMF cannot	be	independently	motivated	by	direct	means,	then	perhaps	it	can	be	motivated	by its	place	in	the	best	metaphysical	theory.	I	have	no	argument	against	such	a	strategy	per	se. But	I	do	think	that	appealing	to	theoretical	virtue	is	a	mere	signal	that	there	may	be	a problem	at	the	end	of	the	day,	and	does	not	justify	the	rejection	of	views	that	violate	FEMF. 31	Thanks	to	Ross	Cameron	for	suggesting	an	inductive	argument,	and	see	Cameron	(2010a). 32	There	is	a	thorough	discussion	in	Wilson	(2015)	of	the	strategy	of	justifying	Hume's	dictum	by	inference	to the	best	explanation.	This	is	a	related	kind	of	inductive	argument,	where	the	basic	idea	is	that	Hume's	dictum is	justified	by	its	utility	in	Lewis's	combinatorial	theory	of	possibility.	Wilson	argues	that	this	combinatorial principle	undergenerates	the	space	of	possibilities,	and	that	the	possible	fixes	are	either	unprincipled,	result in	extensional	inadequacy,	or	violate	Lewis's	reductive	ambitions. 15 The	weighing	of	theoretical	virtues	is	a	tremendously	complicated	project,	and	as	far	as	I know,	no	one	on	either	side	of	FEMF	has	actually	carried	it	out.33 This	is	not	to	say	that	appeals	to	theoretical	virtue	cannot	be	used	to	support	less ambitious	claims.	Lewis	(1986)	appeals	to	simplicity	when	he	argues	that	certain	rival views	are	problematically	committed	to	primitive	modality.	All	other	things	equal,	if	a	rival view	is	committed	to	primitive	modality	that	his	view	can	do	without,	then	his	view	is	to	be preferred.	This	is	a	far	cry	from	the	claim	that	primitive	modality	should	be	avoided	at	all costs.	Some	costs	are	too	high.	After	all,	it	is	a	common	refrain	that	Lewis's	modal	realism should	be	rejected	for	its	ontological	extravagance,	despite	its	promise	of	ideological simplicity. 6.	Starting	points I	have	argued	that	the	direct	and	indirect	routes	to	FEMF	do	not	provide independent	motivation	for	FEMF.	While	this	is	not	a	refutation	of	the	thesis,	it	shows	that FEMF	is	currently	not	well	motivated.	This	is	a	problem	for	those	who	appeal	to	FEMF	in the	course	of	their	arguments.	Schaffer	(2010a)	explicitly	uses	FEMF	as	a	premise	in	his argument	for	priority	monism,	the	view	that	the	whole	(concrete)	universe	is	more fundamental	than	its	parts.	Bennett	(Forthcoming)	invokes	FEMF	in	an	argument	against the	possibility	of	genuinely	indeterministic	building,	where	her	building	relation	takes	us from	the	fundamental	to	the	nonfundamental.34	And	those	who	invoke	the	ideology	of naturalness	typically	hold	that	the	perfectly	natural	properties	form	a	minimal supervenience	base,	so	that	no	perfectly	natural	properties	supervene	on	any	others.35	This may	be	construed	as	an	endorsement	of	FEMF,	for	supervenience	is	a	modal	notion. The	defender	of	FEMF	may	regard	my	arguments	above	as	irrelevant,	for	she	may think	that	no	sensible	defender	of	FEMF	thinks	there	are	good	independent	reasons	to adopt	FEMF	anyway.	She	may	point	out	that	we	must	all	accept	certain	starting	points	in metaphysical	theorizing.	I	would	thus	like	to	end	by	considering	the	question	of	starting points	in	metaphysical	theorizing.	This	is	not	a	topic	on	which	I	have	a	settled	opinion.	It	is a	tremendously	difficult	question.	And	I	am	happy	to	acknowledge	because	metaphysicians must	start	somewhere,	some	may	reasonably	find	themselves	starting	with	FEMF.	What	I have	tried	to	do	in	this	paper	is	show	that,	on	reflection,	the	positive	reasons	for	FEMF	are either	themselves	problematic,	or	come	down	to	mere	intuition.	And	if	it	is	mere	intuition, then	it	is	not	clear	that	FEMF	is	a	better	starting	point	than	others.	This	is	all	I	mean	to	have shown-the	remainder	of	this	section	is	merely	suggestive. First	of	all,	not	all	fundamentality	theorists	endorse	FEMF.	Sider's	(2011)	structural entities,	which	include	predicates	and	quantifiers,	must	fit	together	in	certain	ways.	Wilson (2012)	allows	both	fundamental	determinables	and	determinates,	and	these	must	be related	to	each	other	in	certain	ways.	And	Fine's	(2001)	real	propositions	may	stand	in grounding	relations	to	each	other.	There	is	conceptual	space	between	ontological independence	and	modal	independence,	according	to	many.	I	think	that	this	separation	is valuable	and	should	be	preserved. 33	Perhaps	those	who	hold	'systematic'	views	that	have	broad	scope	across	philosophical	topics	are	closest. 34	In	fact,	FEMF	is	invoked	in	a	number	of	places	in	Bennett	(Forthcoming).	See	for	instance	her	section	6.2, 7.2,	and	8.2.3. 35	Eddon	(2009)	argues	against	this	thesis. 16 Second,	starting	with	FEMF	closes	too	many	doors.	One	may	be	led	to	a	view incompatible	with	FEMF-such	as	those	mentioned	in	section	1-by	following	a	general strategy	of	looking	to	physics	to	provide	one's	fundamental	ontology.	This	strategy	just happens	to	result	in	the	view	that	there	are	fundamental	entities	that	are	determinates	of the	same	determinate,	or	essentially	causal,	etc.	FEMF	rules	out	such	views	from	the	start. We	ought	not	accept	a	thesis	that	from	the	start	rules	out	views	that	result	from	the methodology	of	looking	to	physics	to	provide	one's	fundamental	ontology.	This	is	a	prima facie	reason	to	reject	FEMF. The	same	point	can	be	made	using	historical	examples.	For	instance,	the	notion	of substance	in	the	history	of	western	philosophy	is	arguably	a	notion	of	fundamentality.36	Yet FEMF	seems	to	be	incompatible	many	of	these	views,	for	many	hold	that	the	existence	of finite	substances	is	modally	dependent	upon	the	existence	of	God.	For	another	example,	it is	arguably	the	case	that	for	Plato,	the	Form	of	the	Good	is	fundamental,	yet	there	are necessary	connections	between	Good	and	the	other	Forms.37	In	contrast,	Democritus's atoms	arguably	form	the	basis	of	a	combinatorial	theory	of	possibility.	These	atoms	have only	what	are	called	'primary	qualities'	in	the	seventeenth	century:	size,	shape,	position, solidity,	etc.38	There	is	a	rich	history	behind	us,	and	it	should	be	properly	assessed	in	the context	of	our	contemporary	debates	about	fundamentality	and	related	notions. *	Many	thanks	to	Elizabeth	Barnes,	Ross	Cameron,	Michael	Della	Rocca,	Tom	Donaldson, Nina	Emery,	Martin	Glazier,	Li	Kang,	Michaela	McSweeney,	Carla	Merino,	Daniel	Nolan,	Amy Seymour,	Christina	Van	Dyke,	Jessica	Wilson,	and	audiences	at	the	2015	Pacific	APA,	the 2015	New	Directions	in	Modality	Conference	at	Humboldt	University,	the	2016	Ranch Metaphysics	Conference,	and	Santa	Clara	University. Bibliography Armstrong,	David	M.	1989.	A	Combinatorial	Theory	of	Possibility.	New	York:	Cambridge University	Press. ---.	1997.	A	World	of	States	of	Affairs.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. ---.	2004.	Truth	and	Truthmakers.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Audi,	Paul.	2012a.	"A	Clarification	and	Defense	of	the	Notion	of	Grounding."	In	Metaphysical Grounding:	Understanding	the	Structure	of	Reality,	edited	by	Fabrice	Correia	and Benjamin	Schnieder,	101–121.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. ---.	2012b.	"Grounding:	Toward	a	Theory	of	the	In-Virtue-Of	Relation."	Journal	of Philosophy	109/12:	685-711. Barnes,	Elizabeth.	2012.	"Emergence	and	Fundamentality."	Mind,	121/484:	873–901. 36	Kathrin	Koslicki	has	a	number	of	interesting	papers	on	ontological	dependence,	substancehood,	and essence,	with	a	focus	on	neo-Aristotelian	theories.	See	Koslicki	(2013a,	2013b). 37	Useful	resources	include	Shorey	(1980)	and	Vlastos	(1981).	I	am	indebted	to	Christina	Van	Dyke	for	this and	the	next	example,	though	she	is	not	to	be	held	responsible	for	my	brutish	descriptions	of	these	views. 38	Useful	resources	include	Curd	(1998)	and	Mouralatos	(2004),	though	see	Pasnau	(2007). 17 ---.	Forthcoming.	"Symmetric	Dependence."	In	Reality	and	Its	Structures,	edited	by Ricki	Bliss	and	Graham	Priest.	Oxford	University	Press. Bennett,	Karen.	2011a.	"By	Our	Bootstraps."	Philosophical	Perspectives	25/1:	27–41. ---.	2011b.	"Construction	Area	(No	Hard	Hat	Required)."	Philosophical	Studies	154/1: 79–104. ---.	Forthcoming.	Making	Things	Up.	Oxford	University	Press. Bigelow,	John.	1988.	The	Reality	of	Numbers:	A	Physicalist's	Philosophy	of	Numbers,	Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. Bird,	Alexander.	2007.	Nature's	Metaphysics:	Laws	and	Properties.	Oxford:	Oxford University	Press. Cameron,	Ross.	2008.	"Truthmakers	and	Ontological	Commitment:	or	How	to	Deal	with Complex	Objects	and	Mathematical	Ontology	without	Getting	into	Trouble." Philosophical	Studies,	140:	1–18. ---.	2010a.	"From	Humean	Truthmaker	Theory	to	Priority	Monism."	Noûs	44/1:	178– 198. ---.	2010b.	"How	to	Have	a	Radically	Minimal	Ontology."	Philosophical	Studies,	151/2: 249–264. Clark,	Michael	J.	and	David	Liggins.	2012.	"Recent	Work	on	Grounding."	Analysis	72:	812– 823. Correia,	Fabrice.	2010.	"Grounding	and	Truth-Functions."	Logique	Et	Analyse	53/211:	251– 279. Correia,	Fabrice	and	Benjamin	Schnieder.	2012.	"Grounding:	An	Opinioned	Introduction." In	Metaphysical	Grounding:	Understanding	the	Structure	of	Reality,	edited	by	Fabrice Correia	and	Benjamin	Schnieder,	1–36.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Dasgupta,	Shamik.	2009.	"Individuals:	An	Essay	in	Revisionary	Metaphysics."	Philosophical Studies	145/1:	35–67. deRosset,	Louis.	2009.	"Production	and	Necessity."	Philosophical	Review	118/2:153–181. ---.	2010.	"Getting	Priority	Straight."	Philosophical	Studies	149/1:	73–97. ---.	2013.	"Grounding	Explanations."	Philosophers'	Imprint	13/7:	1–26. Donaldson,	Thomas.	Forthcoming.	"The	(Metaphysical)	Foundations	of	Arithmetic?"	Noûs. Dorr,	Cian	and	Hawthorne,	John.	2013.	"Naturalness."	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaphysics,	Volume 8,	Bennett,	edited	by	Karen	Bennett	and	Dean	Zimmerman,	3–77.	Oxford:	Oxford University	Press. Eddon,	Maya.	2013.	"Fundamental	Properties	of	Fundamental	Properties."	In	Oxford	Studies in	Metaphysics,	Volume	8,	edited	by	Karen	Bennett	and	Dean	Zimmerman,	78–104. Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Fine,	Kit.	1994.	"Essence	and	Modality."	Philosophical	Perspectives	8:	1–16. ---.	1995.	"Ontological	Dependence."	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	95:	269– 290. ---.	2001.	"The	Question	of	Realism."	Philosophers'	Imprint	1/1:	1–30. ---.	2012.	"Guide	to	Ground."	In	Metaphysical	Grounding:	Understanding	the	Structure	of Reality,	edited	by	Fabrice	Correia	and	Benjamin	Schnieder,	37–80.	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press. Fox,	John	F.	1987.	"Truthmaker."	Australasian	Journal	of	Philosophy	65/2:	188–207. Ismael,	Jenann.	and	Schaffer,	Jonathan.	Forthcoming.	"Quantum	Holism:	Nonseparability	as Common	Ground."	Synthese. 18 Jenkins,	Carrie.	2011.	"Is	Metaphysical	Dependence	Irreflexive?"	The	Monist	94/2:	267–276. Jubien,	Michael.	2009.	Possibility.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Kleinschmidt,	Shieva.	2015.	"Fundamentality	and	Time-Travel."	Thought	4/1:	46–51. Kment,	Boris.	2014.	Modality	and	Explanatory	Reasoning.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Koslicki,	Kathrin.	2013a.	"Ontological	Dependence:	An	Opinionated	Survey."	In	Varieties	of Dependence:	Ontological	Dependence,	Grounding,	Supervenience,	Response-Dependence, edited	by	Benjamin	Schnieder,	Miguel	Hoeltje,	and	Alex	Steinberg,	31–64.	München: Philosophia	Verlag. ---.	2013b.	"Substance,	Independence,	and	Unity."	In	Aristotle	on	Method	and Metaphysics,	edited	by	Edward	Feser,	169–195.	Basingstoke,	UK:	Palgrave/MacMillan. Lewis,	David.	1983.	"New	Work	for	a	Theory	of	Universals."	Australasian	Journal	of Philosophy	61/4:	343–377. ---.	1986a.	On	the	Plurality	of	Worlds.	Oxford:	Blackwell	Publishing. ---.	1986b.	Philosophical	Papers,	Volume	II.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Litland,	Jon	E.	2013.	"On	Some	Counterexamples	to	the	Transitivity	of	Grounding."	Essays	in Philosophy	14/1:	19–32. Lowe,	E.J.	2006.	The	Four-Category	Ontology:	A	Metaphysical	Foundation	for	Natural	Science. Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Lowe,	E.J.	2009.	"An	Essentialist	Approach	to	Truth-Making."	In	Truth	and	Truth-Making, edited	by	E.J.	Lowe	and	A.	Rami,	201–216.	Stocksfield:	Acumen. Mulligan,	Kevin,	Peter	Simons,	and	Barry	Smith.	1984.	"Truth-makers."	Philosophy	and Phenomenological	Research	44:	287–321. Pasnau,	Robert.	2007.	"Democritus	and	Secondary	Qualities."	Archiv	für	Geschichte	der Philosophie	89/2:	99–121. Paul,	L.A.	2012.	"Building	the	World	From	Its	Fundamental	Constituents."	Philosophical Studies	158/2:	221–256. ---.	Forthcoming.	"Mereological	Bundle	Theory."	In	Handbook	of	Mereology,	edited	by H.	Burkhardt,	J.	Seibt,	and	G.	Imaguire.	Philosophia	Verlag. Quine,	W.V.	1970.	The	Web	of	Belief.	New	York:	Random	House. Robinson,	Denis.	1993.	"Epiphenomenalism,	Laws	and	Properties."	Philosophical	Studies	69: 1–34. Raven,	Michael.	2013.	"Is	Ground	a	Strict	Partial	Order?"	American	Philosophical	Quarterly 50/2:	193–201. Rodríguez-Pereyra,	Gonzalo.	2006a.	"Truthmakers."	Philosophy	Compass,	1/2:	186–200. ---.	2006b.	"Truthmaking,	Entailment,	and	the	Conjunction	Thesis."	Mind	115:	957– 982. ---.	2015.	"Grounding	is	not	a	Strict	Order."	Journal	of	the	American	Philosophical Association	1/3:	517–534. Rosen,	Gideon.	2010.	"Metaphysical	Dependence:	Grounding	and	Reduction."	In	Modality: Metaphysics,	Logic,	and	Epistemology,	edited	by	Bob	Hale	and	Aviv	Hoffmann,	109–135. Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Schaffer,	Jonathan.	2003.	"The	Problem	of	Free	Mass:	Must	Properties	Cluster?"	Philosophy and	Phenomenological	Research	66/1:	125–138. ---.	2008.	"Truthmaker	Commitments."	Philosophical	Studies	141/1:	7–19. ---.	2010a.	"The	Internal	Relatedness	of	All	Things."	Mind	119/474:	341–36. 19 ---.	2010b.	"The	Least	Discerning	and	Most	Promiscuous	Truthmaker."	Philosophica Quarterly	69/239:	307–324. ---.	2010c.	"Monism:	The	Priority	of	the	Whole."	Philosophical	Review	119/1:	31–76. ---.	2012.	"Grounding,	Transitivity,	and	Contrastivity."	In	Metaphysical	Grounding: Understanding	the	Structure	of	Reality,	edited	by	Fabrice	Correia	and	Benjamin Schnieder,	122–138.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Schnieder,	Benjamin.	2006.	"Truth-making	without	Truth-makers."	Synthese	152/1:	21–46. Shoemaker,	Sydney.	1980.	"Causality	and	Properties."	In	Time	and	Cause,	edited	by	Peter van	Inwagen,	228–254.	Dordrecht:	D.	Reidel. Shorey,	Paul.	1980.	"Idea	of	Good	in	Plato's	Republic."	Selected	Papers,	Volume	II,	28–79. New	York:	Garland. Sider,	Theodore.	2011.	Writing	the	Book	of	the	World.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Skiles,	Alexander.	2015.	"Against	Grounding	Necessitarianism."	Erkenntnis	80/4:	717–751. Trogdon,	Kelly.	2013a.	"An	Introduction	to	Grounding."	In	Varieties	of	Dependence: Ontological	Dependence,	Grounding,	Supervenience,	Response-Dependence,	edited	by Benjamin	Schnieder,	Miguel	Hoeltje,	and	Alex	Steinberg,	97–122.	München:	Philosophia Verlag. ---.	2013b.	"Grounding:	Necessary	or	Contingent?"	Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly	94/4: 465–485. Vetter,	Barbara.	2011.	"Recent	Work:	Modality	Without	Possible	Worlds."	Analysis,	71/4: 742–754. ---.	2015.	Potentiality:	From	Dispositions	to	Modality.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Vlastos,	Gregory.	1981.	"Degrees	of	Reality	in	Plato."	Platonic	Studies,	2nd	Edition,	58–75. Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press. Wang,	Jennifer.	2013.	"From	Combinatorialism	to	Primitivism."	Australasian	Journal	of Philosophy	91/3:	535–554. Weatherson,	Brian.	2006.	"The	Asymmetric	Magnets	Problem."	Philosophical	Perspectives 20:	479–492. ---.	2013.	"The	Role	of	Naturalness	in	Lewis's	Theory	of	Meaning."	Journal	for	the History	of	Analytical	Philosophy,	1/10:	1–19. ---.	2014.	"David	Lewis."	In	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Winter	2014 Edition),	edited	by	E.	Zalta.	URL	= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/david-lewis/>. Wilson,	Jessica.	2010.	"What	is	Hume's	Dictum,	and	Why	Believe	It?"	Philosophy	and Phenomenological	Research	80/3:	595–637. ---.	2012.	"Fundamental	Determinables."	Philosophers'	Imprint	12/4:	1–17. ---.	2014a.	"Hume's	Dictum	and	the	Asymmetry	of	Counterfactual	Dependence."	In Chance	and	Temporal	Asymmetry,	edited	by	Alastair	Wilson,	258–279.	Oxford:	Oxford University	Press. ---.	2014b.	"No	Work	for	a	Theory	of	Grounding."	Inquiry	57/5-6:	535–579. ---.	2015.	"Hume's	Dictum	and	Metaphysical	Modality:	Lewis's	Combinatorialism."	In	A Companion	to	David	Lewis,	edited	by	Barry	Loewer	and	Jonathan	Schaffer,	138–158. Wiley-Blackwell. Wittgenstein,	Ludwig.	1921/1961.	Tractatus	Logico-Philosophicus,	translated	by	D.F.	Pears and	B.F.	McGuinness.	New	York:	Humanities	Press. 20 Zimmerman,	Dean.	Forthcoming.	"A	Recent	Defense	of	Monism	Based	Upon	the	Internal Relatedness	of	All	Things."	In	The	Metaphysics	of	Relations,	edited	by	F.	Clementz	and J.M.	Monnoyer.	Ontos	Verlag.